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In this paper we review the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental health (DSM),
its scientiﬁc bases and utility. The concepts of “normality,” “pathology,” and boundaries
between them are critically reviewed. We further use the concepts of mindfulness and
mindlessness, and evidence from cognitive and social sciences to investigate the DSM
clinical and social impact and we argue against its assigned overpower. We recommend
including alternative perspectives to the DSM, such as mindfulness and positive psychol-
ogy. We also argue for including mindfulness training in psychiatric residency and clinical
psychology programs.
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THE DSM
TheDiagnostic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
is considered the most important document for the diagnosis and
the classiﬁcation of mental disorders. Despite the existence of
alternative diagnostic criteria and approaches [e.g., International
Statistical Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD), Psychodynamic Diag-
nosticManual (PDM)], theDSMcriteria remain the gold standard
for mental health diagnosis. It is published by the American Psy-
chiatric Association (APA), whose initial objective was to establish
a nosology of mental disorders that can constitute a common lan-
guage among clinicians, researchers, health insurance companies,
and the pharmaceutical industry. Five versions and two revisions
of the manual were published since 1952, the last one being its
ﬁfth edition published in May 18, 2013. Since its ﬁrst draft, the
DSMwent throughmanymodiﬁcations. For example the number
of proclaimed mental disorders went from 108 in its ﬁrst version
(1952), to 182 in DSM-II published in 1968, to 265 in DSM-III
published in 1980, followed by its revision DSM-III-R in 1987
with 292 diagnoses, to 354 categories in the DSM-IV published in
1994, followed by its revision DSM-IV-R in 2000 with no signif-
icant modiﬁcations, and lastly the DSM-5, which did not change
signiﬁcantly the number of disorders but rather the criteria (or
thresholds) of diagnoses, leading to a potential inﬂation of some
diagnosis up to 28% (Keely et al., 2008; Corcoran andWalsh, 2010;
Millon et al., 2010; Frances, 2013; Greenberg, 2013). Along with
the increasing number of disorders, the manual went from 130
pages in its ﬁrst edition to 886 pages in its fourth and 991 in its
current edition, this was accompanied with a substantial growth
in the price, sales, and revenues of DSM for the APA reaching
between $5 and $6 million annually, almost 10% of its global rev-
enue (Greenberg, 2013, p. 110). The income from the DSM for
the APA is very trivial in comparison with the income for the
pharmaceutical industry, which exceeds $18 billion a year in sales
of psychotropic medication, with more than $12 billion a year
from antidepressants sales only (Frances, 2013, p. 89). Beyond the
numbers and facts concerning the DSM, which were extensively
addressed elsewhere (e.g., Frances, 2013; Greenberg, 2013), there
is an ongoing debate inside the scientiﬁc and clinical communi-
ties about the DSM science and utility. This papers aims to shed
more light on the science and utility of the DSM categories, while
suggesting other possibilities and alternative approaches.
THE SCIENCE AND UTILITY OF THE DSM
A central aim of the DSM taskforce was to set appropriate cut-
off points between what is considered “normal” from what is
“pathological,” in order to treat the individuals belonging to the
latter category. The concept of pathology is an aprioristic deﬁni-
tion, originally based on statistical distribution (the “S” in DSM),
with an arbitrary decision that is not scientiﬁcally driven (Frances,
2013, p. 24). In fact, the criteria set for cut-offs between “nor-
mal” and “pathological” (e.g., number of symptoms, frequency
and duration of symptoms, and nature/duration of dysfunction
associated with the proclaimed disorder) are also “arbitrary” and
subjective because there is no laboratory test or biological mark-
ers to set the boundary between “normal” and “pathological.” In
addition, there is not scientiﬁc link between basic science (e.g.,
cognitive, neurological and social science) and clinical psychiatry.
Second, cultures differ dramatically in their conception of normal-
ity; what is “normal” in one culture can be considered “abnormal”
or “pathological” in another one. In addition, there are signiﬁcant
within-and-between cultural differences in the manner in which
diagnostic categories are interpreted and diagnostic labels are used
(e.g., Zubin, 1967; Rosenhan, 1973; Crow, 1986; Zinbarg et al.,
1994; Keller et al., 1995). For example, the APA deﬁned homosex-
uality as a mental disorder until the DSM-II in 1973 (Greener,
2013). Third, manifestations (named symptoms in the DSM)
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and behaviors are contextually embedded and vary dramatically
according to the situation, for example, aggressive behavior can be
well-adapted in one context but not in another one. Even if the
DSM partially addresses this issue, subtle contextual differences
may create several diagnostic biases. Last, when normality is set in
relationship to the ability of understanding reality (i.e., in the def-
inition of psychosis and dissociative disorders), it is arguable that
reality itself is constantly changing and hard or even impossible to
grasp.
From another side, studies regarding the prevalence of men-
tal disorders using the DSM categories did not provide coherent
results, as it would be expected. In fact, there are several differences
when comparing the prevalence rates obtained. For example, ret-
rospective studies suggested that the annual prevalence of DSM
psychiatric disorders is around 30% in adults younger than 55
years and projected a lifetime prevalence rate of 50% for a psy-
chiatric disorder by 75 years of age (Kessler et al., 2005). However,
these rates seem to be an underestimation as evidence of forget-
ting is common for recall beyond 6 months (e.g., Harlow and
Linet, 1989; Pillemer andWhite, 1989; Angold andCostello, 1996).
Therefore, prospective studies can be more accurate (Mofﬁtt et al.,
2010; Copeland et al., 2011). Using prospective methodology,
the cumulative prevalence of DSM-IV deﬁned categories among
1037 individuals during a 15-year prospective longitudinal study
(between age 18 and 32) yielded to 50% for an anxiety disorder,
41% for depression, 32% for alcohol dependence, and 18% for
cannabis dependence (Mofﬁtt et al., 2010). Another prospective
longitudinal study assessing 1420 participants for nine times from
9 through 21 years of age yielded to 61.1% for a well-speciﬁed
psychiatric disorder. An additional, 21.4% had met the criteria for
a not otherwise speciﬁed disorder only, increasing the cumulative
prevalence for any disorder to 82.5% (Copeland et al., 2011). In
the youngest cohort, the cumulative prevalence for any disorder
was higher than 90% (Copeland et al., 2011). In addition, there
is evidence of a mounting epidemic of mental disorders in the
last 15 years. In fact, childhood bipolar disorder increased 40-
fold (Moreno et al., 2007), autism increased by 20-fold, attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has tripled (Bloom et al.,
2011), and adult bipolar disorder doubled (Ketter, 2010). These
data add more confusion about the efﬁcacy of the DSM in delin-
eating “normality” from “pathology” as some of these statistics
suggest that almost all of the population has mental disorders.
The DSM-5 taskforce aimed to address this problem by imple-
menting a dimensional aspect to the DSM that was supposed
to reﬂect a continuum view of mental disorders rather than a
categorical one. However, not only the taskforce failed to fully
implement dimensions in the new DSM but also kept its cate-
gorical aspect and reduced the thresholds for many diagnostic
criteria, which can lead to a wide increase in pathologizing previ-
ously considered“normal” individuals (Frances, 2013) making the
population almost totally saturated with mental disorders. These
arguments taken together raise serious questions regarding the sci-
ence behind theDSM,speciﬁcally its reliability, validity and clinical
utility.
In fact multiple reviews questioned the reliability and the
validity of many DSM categories. For example, Blom and
Oberink (2012) found that the construct validity of DSM-IV
post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) in children and adoles-
cents varies among different criteria: where some are highly
valid (e.g., stressor criterion), while others are not (e.g., avoid-
ance, detachment from others, and difﬁculty falling or staying
asleep). In addition, some non-DSM criteria (e.g., guilt) had
better validity than existing ones (e.g., avoidance and emotional
numbing criterion). Vieta and Phillips (2007) argued that the
content, concurrent, discriminant, and predictive validity of bipo-
lar disorder are problematic suggesting a need to improve and
reﬁne diagnostic criteria. Woo and Rey (2005) found that the
validity of the inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive subtypes
of ADHD is not fully supported in the DSM-IV pointing to a
deﬁcit in data on treatment of the inattentive and hyperactive-
impulsive subtypes. In conjunction with these results, a meta-
analysis involving 546 studies concluded that DSM-IV ADHD
subtypes do not identify discrete subgroups with sufﬁcient long-
term stability to justify the classiﬁcation of distinct forms of
the disorder. In summary, many reviews were highly critical of
the DSM, while few others supported some DSM criteria [e.g.,
validity of atypical depression Lam and Stewart (1996); cross-
cultural construct validity of ADHD in children and adolescents
Willcutt (2012)].
These results taken together are particularly disappointing
especially that the DSM went through multiple modiﬁcations and
ameliorations in the last sixty years. In that line, Laungani (2002)
argued that the popularity and extensive use of the DSM is
not an indication of its reliability or validity. A theory, accord-
ing to Lakatos (1970) may be true, even if no one believes
in it, and it may be false, even if everyone believes in it.
In addition, a low congruence was found between DSM-IV
and International Diagnostic Interview (ICD-10) for many psy-
chiatric categories including schizophrenia, schizoaffective dis-
order, bipolar disorder and depression (e.g., Cheniaux et al.,
2009). Moreover, the rising number of individuals qualifying
for at least one psychiatric disorder during lifetime renders
the boundaries between “normal” and “pathological” illusive
and nulliﬁes the DSM validity and its principal reason for
existence.
A second aim for the DSM is supposed to be clinical, i.e., set-
ting a common language among clinicians in order to encourage
collaboration and improving treatments for individuals with a
diagnosis of amental disorder. However, it is questionable why the
DSM labels are needed to further clinical help for patients. Among
the arguments for the use of psychiatric labels is that they are
simple, easy, clear, quick, and convenient to use. If this argument
is true, it is equally problematic as a simple and quick label can
be automatically used without in-depth mental processing. This
is particularly precarious speciﬁcally with the previously shown
prevalence of psychiatric diagnoses among the general population.
Many scholars and clinicians have argued that psychiatric
labels serve only the interests of clinicians and their profes-
sional associations (e.g., APA) as well as the pharmaceutical
industry (Greenberg, 2013), whereas these labels can have dev-
astating effects of the individuals receiving them (e.g., Frances,
2013, p. 109). In fact, labels can create self-fulﬁlling prophe-
cies (Rosenthal and Fode, 1963), reducing expectations, ambi-
tions, and changing other’s perceptions and behaviors toward
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the individual carrying the label (Smith, 2002). Ben-Zeev et al.
(2010) identiﬁed three types of stigma resulting from DSM diag-
noses: public stigma, self-stigma, and label avoidance (Corrigan
andWatson, 2002; Corrigan et al., 2004). Public stigma is the phe-
nomenon of large social groups endorsing negative stereotypes
about, and subsequently acting against, a stigmatized group: in
this case, people with a diagnosis of mental disorder. Self-stigma
is the loss of self-esteem and self-efﬁcacy that occurs when the
individuals internalize public stigma, which may prevent them
from pursuing their life goals (Corrigan, 2006). Label avoidance
is the phenomenon leading individuals to avoid mental health
services in order to avoid the deleterious impact of a stigmatiz-
ing label. In addition, three processes can further exacerbate the
stigma associated with psychiatric labels (Ben-Zeev et al., 2010).
The ﬁrst is groupness deﬁned as the degree to which a collec-
tion of people is perceived as a uniﬁed or meaningful entity
(Campbell, 1958;Hamilton and Sherman,1996). Diagnosis distin-
guishes people with amental disorder from the general population
and adds to the salience of their groupness (Link and Phelan,
2001). Research has also shown a non-speciﬁc prejudice against
people who have a psychiatric disorder compared with people
with other health conditions (Weiner et al., 1988; Corrigan et al.,
2000). In addition, diagnostic labels can serve as priming for
automatic negative stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Bargh et al.,
1996). Negative attitudes were also shown to be automatically
activated among therapists (Abreu, 1999). Moreover, diagnostic
labels of severe mental illness such as schizophrenia and psy-
chosis seem to worsen the level of prejudice and this is even
worse following a ﬁrst psychotic episode (Crisp et al., 2000; Phelan
et al., 2000; Birchwood et al., 2007; Lolich and Leiderman, 2008;
Reed, 2008). The second is homogeneity, where out-groups mem-
bers are seen more homogeneous than in-groups (Tajfel, 1978;
Rothbart et al., 1997; Ashton and Esses, 1999). Categorization or
groupness was also shown to increase negative stereotypes against
out-group members (Link and Phelan, 2001); however, there can
be causal bidirectional relationship between both (Yzerbyt et al.,
1997; Crawford et al., 2002). The third is stability, meaning the
traits that describe group members are believed to remain rela-
tively stable and unchanging (Anderson, 1991; Kashima, 2000).
Stability also supports the idea that psychiatric diagnoses are
unchanging and that individuals are less likely to overcome them
in comparison with those with physical illnesses (Weiner et al.,
1988; Corrigan et al., 2000). This pessimistic view of stability is
even worse in the case of severe mental illness (e.g., psychosis
and schizophrenia; Harding and Zahniser, 1994). Taken together,
these processes can lead to an overgeneralization error, where all
members of a group are expected to manifest the same character-
istics attributed to that group (Ben-Zeev et al., 2010). In addition
psychiatric diagnoses when delivered rigidly, and uncondition-
ally (without being related to speciﬁc contexts) are likely to yield
to internal, stable, incontrollable and global negative attributions
about the self, modifying self-concept and leading to a sense of
hopelessness and learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975), which
ironically was shown to be related to another popular DSM cat-
egory, that is, major depressive disorder (MDD; e.g., Maiden,
1987; Healy andWilliams, 1988; Duman, 2010;Vollmayr andGass,
2013).
Taking into consideration the negative effects of psychiatric
labels, which seem to outweigh any claimed beneﬁts, it is legitimate
to reconsider their clinical utility and their advantages compared to
direct descriptions of thephenomenological experienceof individ-
uals seeking psychiatric or psychological help. For example, simple
and direct experiential descriptors namely, emotions of sadness,
worry, fear, anger, disgust, terror, and lack of energy, motivation,
pleasure, and hope as well as speciﬁc thought patterns (e.g., rumi-
nation, over-generalization, and pessimism), physical sensations
(e.g., fatigue, exhaustion, palpitations, fainting, and sleeplessness),
cognitive processing (e.g., inattention, distraction, and memory
loss), and behaviors (e.g., avoidance, isolation, or aggression)
are common among individuals and provide better insight for
appropriate treatment than abstract psychiatric constructs (e.g.,
depression, anxiety, borderline, and psychosis). In addition, the
attention of the clinician must be particularly directed toward the
distress and suffering experienced by the individual and toward
the mental/behavioral processes that maintain and exacerbate the
suffering (e.g., mind-wandering, identiﬁcation with one’s own
thoughts, acting in opposite ways of personal values, and lack
of self-acceptance and compassion).
In conjunction with their clinical utility, DSM categories are
been argued to be particularly useful for pharmacological treat-
ment. Perhaps this is the best use of psychiatric diagnoses.
However, scientiﬁc research remains unclear and controversial
about the beneﬁts of a speciﬁc type of medication for a spe-
ciﬁc psychiatric diagnosis and psychotropic medications such
as antidepressants and antipsychotics are been prescribed for a
multitude of psychiatric disorders, including sleeping, anxiety,
depression, irritability, eccentricity, temper tantrums in youth,
and crankiness of old age (Frances, 2013, p. 105). In addition, the
psychotropic prescribing industry is being one of the fast grow-
ing, ﬁnancing a large part of DSM related research activities and
ﬁnancing APA itself, leading to important questions regarding the
clinical necessity of such growth and its dubious ethics speciﬁcally
that some of these drugs can be dangerous causingmassive obesity,
diabetes, heart disease, and a shortened life span (Laungani, 2002;
Frances, 2013, p. 89; Greenberg, 2013). Beside these concerns,
and despite of the little scientiﬁc knowledge regarding the mecha-
nisms of actions of most of the prescribed medications, empirical
ﬁndings support their utility for many individuals in speciﬁc
contexts. According to that, it will be irresponsible and uneth-
ical to advise individuals stopping their medications; however,
more scientiﬁc and ethical boundaries must be implemented in
order to reduce unnecessary prescription and to fully explain to
individuals the state of knowledge regarding the possible ben-
eﬁts as well as negative short and long-term effects of these
medications.
Another proclaimed utility for the DSM categories is the
advancement of clinical research. This is true in the scope that a
large number of studieswould useDSMcategories. However,most
of the research outcomes aremeasured using quantitative data, i.e.,
raw numbers resulting from administering speciﬁc clinical mea-
sures, e.g., Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961, 1996;
Beck and Streer, 1987), Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck and Streer,
1993), and qualitative data, mostly obtained through clinical
interviews.
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A last utility for the DSM is proclaimed to be legal as many
of the diagnoses have implications within the legal system (e.g.,
paraphilia). However, despite their use today, it is not advis-
able for health science to be part of the legal debates in courts
as it further undermines its primary role of treating individuals
(Dawes, 1994). Other utilities are within the ﬁnancial, political
and social domains (e.g., health insurance); however, a review of
these beneﬁts is outside the scope of the current paper.
In summary, the DSM, when thoroughly investigated, yields to
some support regarding its reliability but leads to serious ques-
tions about its validity, utility, and ethics. These ﬁndings cannot
justify the overuse of DSM in mental health neither the power nor
authority assigned to the DSM categories besides being only of
ﬁnancial and sociopolitical reasons.
THE DSM: MINDFUL OR MINDLESS?
The discussion about the DSM could be seen in the light of the
concepts of mindfulness/mindlessness (Langer, 1989, 1997, 2012).
Mindlessness is described as a default style of cognitive functioning
in which individuals process cues from the environment in a rela-
tively automatic but inﬂexible manner, without reference to novel
aspects of these cues (Langer and Piper, 1987). By default, old cat-
egories and previously made distinctions are relied on uncritically,
leading to rigid behavior that is rule governed rather than rule
guided. In contrast, mindfulness is described as a general style or
mode of functioning through which individuals actively engage in
reconstructing the environment by creating new categories or dis-
tinctions, and seeking multiple perspectives, thus directing atten-
tion to new contextual cues that may be consciously controlled
or manipulated as appropriate (Langer, 1989, 1997, 2012). There
is growing evidence for the adaptive inﬂuence of mindful func-
tioning on learning, health, and social behavior and, conversely,
for the deleterious effects of mindlessness (e.g., Langer et al., 1978,
1985, 2012; Langer and Newman, 1979; Langer and Piper, 1987;
Langer, 1989, 1992a,b, 1997, 2000, 2009, 2012).
It is been suggested that a mindful approach to language, where
individuals are made aware of alternative perspectives and con-
ceptions of what is being said or written, leads to more control
and better outcomes (Langer and Piper, 1987; Langer, 1992a).
The DSM is an example from the opposite side, being written
using an absolute unconditional language leading to a narrow per-
spective of the complex human mental conditions and states by
labeling some of these conditions as mental disorders. In fact,
the DSM embraced a single intrapersonal deﬁnition of mental
conditions, considering them as internal ﬂaws, due to biological
defects, maladaptation to the society, and/or personality difﬁcul-
ties, minimizing or denying at times the implication of external
(environmental, interpersonal and social) factors and trivializing
the lack of support facing a large number of “normal” individuals
in Western societies today. For example, many of the cognitive
and functional limitations perceived in the elderly can be due to
non-adapted environment, an environment designed by young
adults for young adults and not for the elderly (Langer, 2009).
In the social sciences, this phenomenon is known as the funda-
mental attribution error, deﬁned as the tendency to place a heavy
emphasis on internal characteristics to explain someone else’s
behavior in a given situation, rather than considering external
situational factors (Jones and Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977a). Fun-
damental attribution error is further committed when attention
is fully directed toward the behavior of someone else, speciﬁ-
cally when it is evaluated as deviant (Smith and Miller, 1979;
Robinson and McArthur, 1982; Lassiter et al., 2002), when the
evaluator is in an automatic (mindless) mental mode (Winter
and Uleman, 1984; Uleman, 1987; Moskowitz, 1993; Newman,
1993; Carlston and Skowronski, 1994), or the evaluator lacks
energy or motivation (e.g., Gilbert, 1989), and is more present
in individualistic cultures (e.g., North-American) in compari-
son with collectivist cultures (e.g., Asian; Miller, 1984; Michael
and Kaiping, 1994; Morris and Peng, 1994; Masuda and Nis-
bett, 2001; Langdridge and Trevor, 2004). In addition, the DSM
mindlessly focuses on the inabilities or limitations of the diag-
nosed individuals without outweighing their shortcomings with
their abilities, talents and resilience. Moreover, the DSM does
not acknowledge change across time, but rather focuses on sta-
ble traits (e.g., in deﬁning personality disorders). Being blind
to the reality of continuous change is another aspect of mind-
lessness (Bodner and Langer, 2001). The single perspective of
the DSM can exacerbate prejudice toward already negatively
stereotyped individuals (e.g., individuals with a diagnosis of
mental retardation; Reiss, 2000) and can contribute in justify-
ing the under-investment of governments and health agencies in
underprivileged individuals (Laungani, 2002), by rending their
suffering as their own fault and responsibility and by labeling
them as “abnormal and deviant” (Reiss, 2000; Pilgrim and Rogers,
2005). Such mindless application of diagnostic criteria is con-
sistent with data on illusory correlations and psychodiagnostic
tests (e.g., Chapman and Chapman, 1967, 1969; Dowling and
Graham, 1976; Mirels, 1976), where illusory correlations (i.e.,
non-existing, over-evaluated or even opposite correlations) seem
to persist even with the passage of time blinding the diagnosti-
cian in the face of contradictory reality. This phenomenon was
present not only in projective and non-empirical psychological
tests (e.g., Wheeler-Rorschach; Chapman and Chapman, 1969)
but equally in empirical test batteries (e.g., Minnesota Multipha-
sic Personality Inventory – MMPI; Dowling and Graham, 1976)
and was shown to be more pronounced among more experienced
diagnosticians than novice ones (Dowling and Graham, 1976).
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is premature cogni-
tive commitment (Chanowitz and Langer, 1981), where previously
created categories are available for mindless use (e.g., Langer
and Imber, 1979), even if information is presented in a single
instance (e.g., Chanowitz and Langer, 1980). This phenomenon
was shown to worsen with time (i.e., with the exposure to previ-
ously learnedmaterial) as in the case of experienced diagnosticians
(Dowling and Graham, 1976). This is particularly true when
information is presented in an absolute, unconditional, author-
itarian, and stable manner (Langer and Piper, 1987), which is
the case of most psychodiagnostic tests and the DSM diagnostic
criteria. Absolute diagnostic categories encourage habit, reduce
uncertainty and unpleasant insecurity among diagnosticians but
at the same time render it difﬁcult for them to produce alter-
native, novice perceptions, distinctions or categories, making
them mindlessly following previously established rules and cat-
egories without doubting or questioning these rules. In addition,
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medical residents and graduate psychology students are less prone
to learn when taught with unconditional material (e.g., using
DSM categories; Langer, 1997, 2000). Moreover, when presented
with absolute diagnostic labels from a trusted ﬁgure of scientiﬁc
authority (e.g., psychiatrist, psychologist or other mental health
professionals), the individual receiving the label, even though,
she is more mindful about her condition, will most likely give-
up personal control accepting the label mindlessly and resigning
powerlessly to its consequences, which can be devastative in
many cases. In such dynamic of clinician power, authority and
knowledge versus unpowered and diagnostic-naive “patient”, it
is highly likely that the latter will experience a lack of personal
control, self-determination, in addition to the shame, stigma and
infringement to self-dignity and self-esteem, with powerful physi-
cal andmental negative consequences. A counter-mechanism is to
increase the control of individuals on their own health whether
physical or mental, which was shown to have powerful posi-
tive consequences (Langer and Rodin, 1976; Rodin and Langer,
1977).
According to social science, the DSM can be considered as a
perfect example of actor–observer bias (Kelley, 1967; Nisbett et al.,
1973; Ross, 1977b;Watson, 1982; Jones and Nisbett, 1987; Gilbert,
1995), which refers to the tendency of emphasizing internal, dis-
positional causes (e.g., personality traits) when explaining others’
behavior but considering own behavior to stem primarily from
external, situational factors (e.g., being under stress). Malle et al.
(2007) and Malle (2004, 2006) suggested a contribution of cogni-
tive access and beliefs (e.g., the lack of context-speciﬁc information
and the use of heuristics) among observers due to motivational
differences with actors. This deﬁnition when applied to a non-
contextually based DSM, and considering the possible motivation
of the DSM users, suggests an increase in mindless use of DSM
categories among mental health professionals. Laungani (2002)
argued that conceptions of normality derived through the use of
the DSM are, to a large extent, based on notions of social confor-
mity. When clinicians are referring only to social conventions and
previously learned information (e.g., DSM categories) in mak-
ing their mind about their perceived “mentally ill” patients, they
are less prone to seek novel information and less likely to have
an open and curious orientation toward their patients’ environ-
ment. Such mindless orientation towards the past may lead to
misdiagnosis, mistreatment, and seriously compromise the thera-
peutic alliance between the professional and the individual seeking
help.
In summary, the DSM is not only a mindless categorization of
mental conditions, but also the way in which it is taught to men-
tal health professionals encourages a mindless use of the DSM
categories. That is similar to a widely diffused approach toward
medical data, which is collected, justiﬁed, accepted, and used
uncritically and mindlessly (Langer, 2012).
BEYOND THE DSM
Few attemptsweremade inWestern sciences to understand human
mental conditions and suffering beyond diagnostic categories. For
example, Millon et al. (2010, Chap. 30) tried to extend the cri-
teria of borderline personality disorder (as deﬁned in the DSM)
by including evolutionary, social, and cultural factors recognizing
the diversity of the syndrome. However, the authors did not con-
sider the abilities and resilience of individuals with the proclaimed
syndrome.
An alternative model was also proposed in positive psychol-
ogy (e.g., Peterson and Seligman, 2004) categorizing a set of
24 personality traits of “character strength and virtues.” Among
these traits are: creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, wisdom,
love, kindness, social intelligence, forgiveness, humility, self-
regulation, and gratitude. It is noteworthy that many of these
traits are related to mindfulness, whether deﬁned according to
Eastern tradition (e.g., Baer et al., 2004, 2006; Hutcherson et al.,
2008) or to Western science (e.g., Langer, 1989, 1997, 2005, 2009;
Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000a; Haigh et al., 2011). A mind-
ful constructivist approach to the mental health sciences must
be developed by recognizing the cultural and social embedded-
ness of the individual rather than using any single deﬁnition or
set of criteria for human conditions (Langer and Moldoveanu,
2000b). This approach may be the key for the development
of mindful clinical psychology and psychiatry. The data sug-
gest that mindfulness is related to better outcomes for patients
of therapists practicing Zen meditation (Grepmair et al., 2007).
Once having realized that mindfulness can be a key element
in providing better health services, the next question will be
how to encourage health care professionals to learn and practice
mindfulness.
Reiss (2000) suggested thatmindfulness hasmotivational bases;
the most important appears to be a desire to learn (curiosity).
By engaging in mindful thinking, people can satisfy their desire
for curiosity. Other motivational components are: a low need
for an order (allowing for a greater creativity and mental ﬂex-
ibility), and a need for independence, deﬁned as a desire for
self-reliance, allowing the individual to rely on his/her own ideas
and to think more freely and independently from conventions or
external pressures (e.g., peer pressure and authority). These moti-
vational bases must be used in designing and developing training
programs for psychiatric residents and psychology graduate stu-
dents encouraging them to uphold an open, curious and multiple
perspective (mindful) attitude while investigating the conditions
of their patients. Mindfulness can also be learned by imitating
the behavior of a mindful therapist or supervisor. This further
supports teaching mindfulness to supervisors and health decision
makers.
CONCLUSION
The DSM shows both scientiﬁc and clinical limits, its wide use and
the blind approval of its categories and criteria must be carefully
reconsidered.When theDSM is used, itmust be accompaniedwith
alternative perspectives, emphasizing different aspects of human
suffering including social, environmental, and political dimen-
sions. Clinicians should also be mindful about the strengths and
abilities of their patients and should emphasize their resilience
rather than their perceived deﬁcits. Other disciplines, namely cog-
nitive and social sciences should be used as a solid foundation of
a new scientiﬁcally driven clinical psychology and psychiatry. It is
time that psychological science moves from the mindless investi-
gation of mental disorders and psychopathology to the mindful
science of mental states and consciousness.
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